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ARTICLE 
CONTROL BEGINS AT HOME: 
INTRODUCTION 
TACKLING FLAGS OF 
CONVENIENCE 
AND IUU FISHING 
DEIRDRE WARNER-KRAMER' 
In 1999, French authorities arrested a vessel named the 
Camouco, flagged to Panama, for illegally fishing Patagonian 
toothfish near the Crozet Islands. Mter Panama successfully 
petitioned the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea for 
its release,l the vessel was renamed the Arvisa 1 and flagged to 
Uruguay. In January 2002, an Australian research vessel 
spotted the Arvisa 1 fishing near Prydz Bay in eastern Antarc-
tica; at the time the vessel claimed to be the Mauritanian-
flagged Kambott. By July 2002, now named the Eternal and 
flagged to the Netherlands Antilles, she was again arrested for 
Deirdre Warner-Kramer is Senior Atlantic Fisheries Officer in the Office of 
Marine Conservation, U.S. Department of State. She is the lead State Department 
representative on U.S. delegations to the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization 
(NAFO) and the International Commission for Atlantic Tunas (lCCAT), where she 
negotiated both 2002's positive and negative vessel listing measures and 2003's com-
prehensive trade measure scheme. Ms. Warner-Kramer has a Bachelor of Arts from 
Bryn Mawr College and has previously written on stateless fishing vessels. The views 
expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily represent those of 
the Department of State or the U.S. Government. 
1 See Press Release, Int'l Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (Panama v. France) 35, 
(February 7, 2000) for a summary of the judgment awarding prompt release in the 
Camouco Case, available at http://www.itlos.org/newsipressJeleasel2000/press_ 
release_35_en.pdfOast visited March 17, 2004). 
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illegally harvesting Patagonian toothfish in the French Exclu-
sive Economic Zone (hereinafter "EEZ") off Kerguelen Island.2 
While the case of the vessel above is an extreme, it clearly 
illustrates the problems that vessels flying flags of convenience3 
pose to international fisheries management. Vessels like the 
Camouco exploit the ease of changing names and registries to 
avoid both effective control by their flag states and compliance 
with regional fisheries management rules. And even when, 
like the Camouco, they are caught engaging in illegal fishing, 
the principle of exclusive flag state jurisdiction severely limits 
the international community's ability to prosecute these ves-
sels. 
The sorts of fishing activities commonly labeled illegal, un-
reported, and unregulated (hereinafter "IUD") are broad in 
scope and universal in occurrence;' fishing conducted by vessels 
flying flags of convenience is only one small part of the global 
IUD fishing phenomenon. Nonetheless, these vessels tend to 
have high catch rates and are subject to little if any flag state 
control or oversight. As such, they represent a threat to sus-
tainable fisheries management disproportionate to their overall 
number: and they have been the focus of much of the last dec-
ade's international efforts to impose order on high seas fisher-
Ies. 
States and international organizations may disagree on 
the most effective approach to controlling or eliminating this 
type of fishing, but most agree on the urgency of the situation. 
Fully seventy-five percent of the world's fisheries resources are 
being harvested at or beyond sustainable levels," and those 
2 See Australia's 2001-2002 Rep. of Member's Activities to the Commission for 
the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), available at 
http://www.ccamlr.org/puJE/pubslmal01-02lAustralia-02.pdf, 4 (last visited March 17, 
2004). 
3 There is no agreed legal definition for "flag of convenience" or "open registry." 
Although some States and international organizations make distinctions between the 
two terms, in this paper they are treated as synonyms. See Section II, infra. 
, See the definitions of IUU fishing in Section II of the International Plan of 
Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, 
Food and Agriculture Organization, 2001 [hereinafter IPOA-IUU]. 
5 The average length of fishing vessels flying flags of convenience in 1999 was 
almost fifty meters; vessels this size represent a formidable catching power. See 
Greenpeace International, 2001, Pirate Fishing: Plundering the Oceans, 8, (2001). 
6 Food and Agriculture Organization, Fisheries Department, The State of World 
Fisheries and Aquaculture 2002, 23 [hereinafter SOFIA). 
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primarily fished on the high seas are among the hardest hit. 
At the same time, the value of fish has increased tremendously 
in the last decade - international trade in fish products hit a 
record high of over $55 billion in 2000 following four percent 
annual growth since 1990.7 The incentive to circumvent in-
creasingly strict conservation and management regimes and 
capitalize on ever-increasing market demand is powerful, and 
some flag states either are not able or are not willing to ensure 
compliance by their vessels. 
This article looks at the efforts to control fishing by vessels 
flying flags of convenience from a global, regional, and national 
perspective. The international community has struggled for 
decades with notions of flag State control over fishing vessels 
and what kind of "genuine link" ought to exist between a vessel 
and its State of registry. Global instruments negotiated in the 
1990's looked for ways to elaborate the broad principles laid out 
in international law up until that time. Regional fisheries 
management organizations stepped in and developed a broad 
suite of tools for combating IUU fishing in the fisheries under 
their purview. And individual nations have taken up efforts to 
exert control over vessels flying their flag and, in some cases, to 
assist others to do the same. 
I. THE PROBLEM 
Sources vary on exactly which states maintain open regis-
tries. One author has determined three categories of States in 
regard to registration of ships: 1) those who maintain open reg-
istries, i.e. offer flags of convenience; 2) those who maintain 
closed registries and set clear requirements for ownership and 
control; and 3) those who maintain "compromise" registries, 
that is, they set some conditions for registration but do not re-
quire the same level of connection between owners/operators 
and the State as closed registers do.s The United Nations Con-
ference on Trade and Development (hereinafter "UNCTAD") 
draws a distinction between what it calls "international regis-
tries" where the proportion of vessels owned by nationals of the 
7 Id. at 3. 
S KX. Li and J. Wonham, 1999, "New Developments in Ship Registration", 14 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 137. 
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flag State is at least thirty percent, and "open registries" where 
the share owned by nationals of the flag State is ten percent or 
less." The International Transport Workers' Federation (here-
inafter "ITF") defines flags of convenience simply as those who 
"rent out their flags to ship owners seeking to evade their own 
country's rules.»!o 
In assessing the prevalence of fishing vessels flying flags of 
convenience, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (hereinafter "FAO") used a combination of 
these standards to identify thirty-two open registry States that 
include or have included fishing vessels, as of March 2002 - a 
sharp increase from eleven in 1980.11 Likewise, the number of 
fishing vessels on open registries has risen in recent years; in 
1998 they constituted about ten percent of the world's fishing 
fleet but grew to about 12.5 percent in 2001. 12 Because many of 
these vessels re-flag multiple times within a year, or even· 
maintain more than one registration, Lloyds Maritime Infor-
mation Services listed over 1,300 fishing vessels flying an "un-
known flag" in 2001, a sharp increase from only fourteen in 
1998.13 
By definition, flag of convenience fishing vessels have little 
or no connection to the territory of their state of registry. It 
follows, then, that these vessels do not fish in the EEZ of their 
flag; as the ITF asserts, "there is little to be gained from regis-
tering a fishing vessel within an FOe, apart from either being 
able to circumvent the applicable management regime or to 
fish illegally."14 States that offer open registries to fishing ves-
9 UNCTAD Secretariat, Review of Maritime Transport, 2003 
(UNCTADIRMT/2003), 54. 
10 International Transport Workers' Federation, 2003, Steering the Right Course: 
Towards an Era of Responsible Flag States and Effective International Governance of 
Oceans and Seas, 11. 
11 Judith Swan, 2002, Fishing Vessels Operating under Open Registers and the 
Exercise of Flag State Responsibilities. Information and Options, FAO Fisheries Circu-
lar 980, 4 and App. 1. Most sources concur that Belize, Panama, Honduras, and St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines top the list of major fisheries flags of convenience. 
12 ITF 2003 at 25. 
13 International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, Trade Union Advisory 
Committee to the OECD, International Transport Workers' Federation, and Green-
peace International, 2002, More Troubled Waters: Fishing, Pollution and FOCs, Major 
group submission for the World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg, 
26 Aug. - 6 Sept. 2002, 18, though some of these vessels may have been removed from 
their original registers prior to being scrapped. See SOFIA at 21. 
14 More Troubled Waters, supra at 19. 
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sels rarely offer much in the way of monitoring and control over 
those vessels. Few of the most notorious flag of convenience 
States are members of the regional fisheries management or-
ganizations charged with the maintenance of the stocks these 
vessels target. And none has ratified the major international 
instruments governing fisheries on the high seas. 
The lack of oversight by open registries does not just jeop-
ardize sustainable fisheries management; vessels flying these 
flags are also much more likely to ignore other standards. Of 
the major open registries, only Panama has enacted national 
legislation covering each of the existing standards set by the 
International Labour Organization for work in the fisheries 
sector.lS The safety and environmental protection track record 
of these vessels is also poor - in 2001, seven of the top ten flag 
states for ship detentions in ports of countries party to the 
Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control 
were open registries. These vessels accounted for 774 of just 
over 1000 total detentions. 16 Recent investigations are also un-
covering increasing evidence that these vessels are connected 
through their beneficial owners to international criminal net-
works. 17 
IUU fishing by vessels flying flags of convenience under-
mines international efforts to conserve and manage shared 
fisheries resources, disadvantages legitimate fishers, jeopard-
izes food security, and is often associated with a general disre-
gard for labor rights and environmental protection.18 The past 
decade has seen concerted efforts to find ways to address these 
problems within international law. The international commu-
nity has searched for a way to compel flag States to fulfill their 
15 See generally International Labour Office, 2003, Conditions of Work in the 
Fishing Sector. A Comprehensive Standard (a Convention Supplemented by a Recom-
mendation) on Work in the Fishing Sector, Report V (1) for the 92nd Session of the In-
ternational Labour Conference, 1 - 17 June 2004. (On file with the author) 
16 More Troubled Waters, supra note 13, at 12. 
17 Gavin Hayman and Duncan Brack, 2002, International Environmental Crime: 
The Nature and Control of Environmental Black Markets, Report of the Royal Institute 
ofInternational Affairs experts workshop of the same name, London, 27 - 28 May 2002. 
(On file with the author) 
18 Food and Agriculture Organization, 2002, "Implementation of the Interna-
tional Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate illegal, Unreported and Unregu-
lated Fishing", FAO Technical Guidelines for Responsible Fisheries No.9, 1 [hereinaf-
terFAO). 
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duties to control these vessels or, when they cannot or will not 
do so, to find a way to act in their stead. 
II. FREEDOM OF THE HIGH SEAS AND THE EXCLUSMTY OF 
FLAG STATE JURISDICTION 
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (hereinafter ''UNCLOS")'9 codified two principles of cus-
tomary international law - the fundamental freedom of the 
high seas and the exclusivity of flag state jurisdiction over ves-
sels on the high seas. Neither of these principles is, however, 
absolute. The freedom to use the high seas is to be exercised 
with due regard for both "the interests of other States in their 
exercise of the freedom of the high seas" and "the rights under 
this Convention with respect to activities" on the high seas:O 
Article 92 allows exceptions to exclusive flag State jurisdiction 
both under other parts of UNCLOS itself and under other in-
ternational treaties. 
Even in some of its earliest articulations, the concept of 
free access to the oceans was conditioned on the need for some 
degree of order on the high seas:' Particularly for fisheries, as 
more and more nations began in the 1950's to build fleets capa-
ble of harvesting on the high seas, the principle of open use 
began to evolve into one of reasonable use.22 The 1958 Conven-
tion on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the 
High Seas (1958 Fishing Convention),23 one of four treaties that 
grew out of the UN's efforts, through the International Law 
Commission, to codify international law relating to the oceans, 
tempered the freedom to fish on the high seas with the recogni-
tion of the rights of other states to do the same. At the same 
time, the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas (High 
19 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982,21 ILM 1245, in force 
November 1994 [hereinafter UNCLOS). 
20 UNCLOS Article 87. 
21 UN "Memorandum on the Regime of the High Seas" UN Document AlCN.4132, 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1950,69. 
22 Francisco Orrego Vicuna, "The International Law of High Seas Fisheries: 
From Freedom of Fishing to Sustainable Use," Governing High Seas Fisheries: The 
Interplay of Global and Regional Regimes, 24, (Olav Schram Stokke, ed. 2001). 
23 Ckneva Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of 
the High Seas, 559 United Nations Treaty Series 285 (1958) [hereinafter 1958 Fishing 
Convention). This Convention entered into force in 1966, but it was never ratified by 
several major fishing States (e.g .. Canada, Japan, China, Iceland, Norway). 
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Seas Convention)24 set a broad standard that the high seas were 
open to all nations, whether coastal or not, though this freedom 
"shall be exercised by all States with reasonable regard to the 
interest of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the 
high seas.'''5 
If, as stated in Article 2 of the High Seas Convention, "no 
State may validly purport to subject any part of [the high seas] 
to its sovereignty," it follows that, with few exceptions, no State 
has the right to prevent another from using the high seas, or to 
exert its jurisdiction over another State's vessel on the high 
seas!6 A vessel can therefore be viewed as a floating piece of 
the territory of the nation whose flag it flies; save in specific 
circumstance such as piracy or the existence of an international 
treaty to the contrary, a flag State has the same exclusive right 
to exercise legal and enforcement jurisdiction over its vessels 
on the high seas as over its own territory.27 
In 1956, the International Law Commission emphasized 
the fundamental role of exclusive flag State jurisdiction to the 
maintenance of order on the high seas, noting that the "absence 
of any authority over ships sailing the high seas would lead to 
chaos. One of the essential adjuncts to the principle of the 
freedom of the seas is that a ship must fly the flag of a single 
State.'>2B The High Seas Convention acknowledged this point in 
Article 6(1)29 and UNCLOS lifted the language of this Article 
almost verbatim into Article 92. 
With the rights of exclusive jurisdiction came responsibili-
ties to exercise that jurisdiction effectively to preserve the or-
der of the high seas. The High Seas Convention laid out a few 
responsibilities for flag States to, inter alia, take necessary 
measures to ensure safety at sea, prevent pollution, and punish 
24 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, 450 United Nations Treaty Series 11 
(1958) [hereinafter High Seas Convention). 
25 Id. at Art. 2. 
26 R.R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe, 1999, The Law of the Sea, 3'" ed., 166. 
27 See Rachel Canty, 1998, "Limits of Coast Guard Authority to Board Foreign 
Flag Vessels on the High Seas," 23 Tulane Maritime Law Journal, 125. 
28 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its seventh ses-
sion, 23 April - 4 July 1956 (UN Doc. Al3159), in Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission, 1956, Vol. II (UN Doc. AlCN.4ISER.AlI956/Add.I), 279. 
29 "Ships shall sail under the flag of one State only and, save in exceptional cases 
expressly provided for in international treaties or in these articles, shall be subject to 
its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas." 
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the transport of slaves.30 But UNCLOS built upon those re-
quirements by including, in Article 94, both a general exhorta-
tion to all States to "effectively exercise its jurisdiction and con-
trol in administrative, technical and social mattes over ships 
flying its flag" and a specific, though not exhaustive, list of flag 
state duties. 
UNCLOS also brought in aspects of the 1958 Fishing Con-
vention related to flag states' duties to adopt measures for the 
conservation of fisheries resources on the high seas and to co-
operate with other states in the same. However, in establish-
ing the regime of the EEZ, UNCLOS expanded these princi-
ples, setting out specific duties to cooperate in the management 
of particular stocks, such as anadromous or highly migratory 
species, that occur both on the high seas and in coastal States' 
internal waters or EEZs.31 It also reinforced the duty to con-
serve resources on the high seas through specifying an obliga-
tion to determine total allowable catch within and beyond the 
EEZs and take "such measures for their respective nationals as 
may be necessary for the conservation of the living resources of 
the high seas."32 
The responsibility of a flag state to control its vessels and 
cooperate with other States as an essential complement to ex-
clusive flag State jurisdiction was central to the global fisheries 
instruments that grew out of UNCLOS in the 1990s. First, 
while noting that "the adoption, monitoring and enforcement of 
effective conservation measures, is inadequate in many areas," 
the 1992 Cancun Declaration instructed the UN Food and Ag-
riculture Organization to take the lead in creating a code of 
conduct for responsible fisheries. 33 The Code, finalized in 1995, 
is a voluntary instrument that, nonetheless, includes specific 
flag State duties not only to cooperate in the sustainable man-
agement of fisheries resources but also to "take enforcement 
measures in respect of fishing vessels entitled to fly their flag 
30 See, e.g., High Seas Convention Articles 10, 13, 24, and 25. 
31 See generally UNCLOS Article 63-67 for provisions dealing with straddling, 
highly migratory, anadromous, and catadromous stocks, as well as marine mammals. 
32 UNCLOS Article 117. See generally Articles 116-120 regarding conservation 
and management of the living resources of the high seas. 
33 Declaration of the International Conference on Responsible Fishing, Cancun, 
Mexico, 6-8 May 1992, available at http://wwwoceanlaw.netitexts/cancun.htm (last 
visited March 17, 2004). 
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which have been found by them to have contravened applicable 
conservation and management measures."" 
The Cancun Declaration also called upon states to "take ef-
fective action, consistent with international law, to deter re-
flagging of vessels as a means of avoiding compliance with ap-
plicable conservation and management rules for fishing activi-
ties on the high seas." This was echoed in the Agenda 21 chap-
ter on the oceans adopted during the UN Conference on Envi-
ronment and Development,3S and resulted in the negotiation of 
the FAO Compliance Agreement in 1993.36 The Compliance 
Agreement fully elaborates the responsibilities of flag States 
whose vessels fish on the high seas, in particular establishing a 
requirement that each such vessel must have an authorization 
to fish issued by its flag State.37 
Although its fundamental premise is the primary jurisdic-
tion of the flag state over its vessels fishing on the high seas, 
and the duties that comprise the exercise of that jurisdiction,as 
the Compliance Agreement also calls upon all states to cooper-
ate in regard to vessels that do not fulfill the obligation to com-
ply with agreed international measures. Much of this coopera-
tion is to be effected through information exchange facilitated 
by the FAO; specifically, through a database of all registered 
fishing vessels over 24 meters in length.39 The cooperation 
should also be bilateral; Article V also states that non-flag 
States may make a determination that a vessel in its port has 
engaged in activities that undermine the effectiveness of inter-
national conservation and ma..'1agement measures. But it also 
.. FAO, 1995, Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, Art. 8.2.7. 
35 Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, 
Rio de Janeiro, 3 - 4 June 1992 (UN Doc. AlCONF.151126, Vol. II) Agenda 21, para. 
17.52. 
36 Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Man-
agement Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas, 1993, 33 lLM 969, in force 
April 2003 !hereinafter Compliance Agreementl. 
37 ld. at Art. 111.2. This requirement may be waived by flag States for vessels 
less than 24 meters in length, but only if the State determines such an exemption 
would not "undermine the object and purpose" of the Agreement. ld. at Art. 11.2. 
as [d. at Art. 111.3 "No Party shall authorize any fishing vessel entitled to fly its 
flag to be used for fishing on the high seas unless the Party is satisfied that it is able, 
taking into account the links that exist between it and the fishing vessel concerned, to 
exercise effectively its responsibilities under this Agreement in respect of that fishing 
vesseL" 
39 [d. at Art. VI. 
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goes on to say that the next step after such a determination is 
to notify the flag state and make arrangements what additional 
investigation, if any, the port state may undertake. Presuma-
bly, if the flag state is unwilling or unable to exert effective 
control over the vessel, under the Compliance Agreement, the 
port State has little recourse to further action. 
The 1995 United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement'1O echoes 
the general concept of flag State responsibility contained in the 
Compliance Agreement and UNCLOS before it. But the Fish 
Stocks Agreement allows less discretion to flag States and ex-
plicitly, in Article 18(1), requires compliance with subregional 
and regional conservation and management measures.') Nota-
bly, it was the first global instrument to spell out circum-
stances - other than those specified by an international 
agreement or treaty - where a non-flag state may take action 
against a vessel undermining the effectiveness of international 
fisheries conservation and management measures. Article 
21(1) allows States party to the Fish Stocks Agreement and 
also a member of a regional fisheries organization or arrange-
ment to board and inspect fishing vessels of any other State 
party to the Fish Stocks Agreement, whether or not that State 
is a member of the regional body in question. In essence, states 
party to the Fish Stocks Agreement are bound to apply even 
conservation and management measures adopted under a re-
gional agreement to which it is not a party." Article 20(7) fur-
ther allows states party to the Fish Stocks Agreement and 
members of regional bodies or arrangements to take actions, in 
accordance with international law, "to deter vessels which have 
engaged in activities which undermine the effectiveness of or 
otherwise violate the conservation and management measures 
established by that organization or arrangement from fishing 
on the high seas ... until such time as appropriate action is 
taken by the flag State." 
.0 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, Relating to the Conservation 
and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 1995, 
34 ILM 1542, in force December 2001 [hereinafter Fish Stocks Agreement) . 
• ) Budislav Vukas & Davor Vidas, "Flags of Convenience and High Seas Fishing: 
The Emergence of a Legal Framework" 69 (Olav Schram Stokke ed., 2001) . 
• 2 Id. at 76. 
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The result is an affirmative duty beyond the general obli-
gation for flag states to cooperate in earlier instruments; that 
is, under the Fish Stocks Agreement, no one can fish in a high 
seas area covered by a regional organization except through the 
regional organization or by observing the conservation and 
management rules established by the organization:a The In-
ternational Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate 
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IUU-IPOA)," 
adopted by FAO in 2001 as one of four voluntary plans of action 
developed within the framework of the Code of Conduct, reiter-
ated this principle in regard to all states; states have a respon-
sibility to ensure that their nationals, not just vessels, comply 
with relevant fisheries conservation and management meas-
ures:" Since negotiation of the Fish Stocks Agreement, many 
regional fisheries management organizations have given effect 
to this principle through measures that seek the compliance of 
both members and non-members. 
III. A "GENUINE LINK" 
As described above, recent global fisheries instruments 
have elaborated the responsibility of a flag state to maintain 
effective control over its vessels on the high Seas and, increas-
ingly, have acknowledged circumstances whereby other states 
may act if the flag State cannot or will not exercise that con-
trol. But an important consideration in regard to a flag state's 
ability to control its vessels fishing on the high seas is what 
standards, if any, exist governing the conditions under which a 
State grants its flag in the first place. 
In general, international law has held that States have the 
discretion to determine how and why they grant their national-
ity to ships. In 1905, the Permanent Court of Arbitration noted 
43 Satya Nandan "The United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks and its Potential Impact on Pacific Island Tuna Fisher-
ies," statement made at the Conference on Achieving Goals for Sustainable Living in 
the Aquatic Continent, Hawaii, 19 - 23 Sept. 1995, cited in Vicuna, supra note 22 at 42. 
44 See supra note 4. 
45 See e.g. id. at para. 17, "In the light of relevant provisions of the 1982 UN 
Convention, and without prejudice to the primary responsibility of the flag State on the 
high seas, each State should, to the greatest extent possible, take measures or cooper-
ate to ensure that nationals subject to their jurisdiction do not support or engage in 
IUU fishing. All States should cooperate to identify those nationals who are the opera-
tors or beneficial owners of vessels involved in IUU fishing." 
11
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that, "it belongs to every sovereign to decide to whom he will 
accord the right to fly his flag and to prescribe the rules gov-
erning such grants."" This sentiment was also expressed by 
the special rapporteur for the Law of the Sea in his 1950 report 
to the International Law Commission, but he further went on 
to note that no State's standards should differ from those in 
common practice." 
An early draft of the text that would become Article 5(1) of 
the High Seas Convention set out unambiguous criteria for de-
termining the "national character" of a ship, specifically that 
the vessel must either be property of the state in question or be 
at least 50 percent owned by a national, partnership, or com-
pany of that state.48 In the comments accompanying this draft, 
the International Law Commission noted a parallel between 
granting nationality to a person and issuing registration to a 
vessel and further highlighted a concern that "control and ju-
risdiction by a state over ships flying its flag can only be effec-
tively exercised when there is in fact a relationship between 
the state and the ship other than that based on mere registra-
tion."49 
In the end, Article 5(1) of the High Seas Convention en-
shrined the notion that each State determines the terms for 
granting its nationality to ships, registering ships in its terri-
tory, and allowing vessels to fly its flag. But it goes on to re-
quire a "genuine link between the State and the ship; in par-
ticular, the State must effectively exercise its jurisdiction and 
control in administrative, technical and social matters over 
ships flying its flag." 
What constitutes a "genuine link" has been the subject of 
considerable debate ever since. It is not a term with estab-
lished meaning in international law. The High Seas Conven-
tion was the first to use it; it does not appear in any other con-
46 Muscat Dhows (France v. Great Britain), 2 AJIL 921, 924 cited in Churchill 
and Lowe, supra note 26, 205. 
47 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its second session, 
5 June to 29 July 1950 (UN Doc. Al1316) in Yearbook of the International Law Com-
mission, 1950, Vol. II (UN Doc. AlCN.4ISER.Al1950/Add.1). 
46 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its seventh session, 2 May to 8 
July 1955 (UN Doc. N2934), in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1955, Vol. 
I, (UN Doc. AlCN.4ISER.Al1955). 
49 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol. II, (UN Doc. 
AlCN.4ISER.Al1955/Add. 1), 23 (1955). 
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ventions dealing with nationality of individuals or aircraft. 50 
One clue as to the intention may be found in Article 6(1) High 
Seas Convention, which states, "a ship may not change its flag 
during a voyage or while in a port of call, save in the case of a 
real transfer of ownership or a change of registry." The impli-
cation of the phrase "real transfer of ownership" of the vessel 
suggests the registration of the vessel and the owner's real 
connection with the State of nationality are directly related:1 
In UNCLOS, which separates the provisions dealing with 
the granting of nationality from those describing flag State du-
ties/2 the meaning of the "genuine link" requirement is even 
less clear (though the notion of "real change of ownership" per-
sists in Article 92). By the early 1990s, concerns over the det-
rimental effects of fishing vessels re-flagging to avoid compli-
ance with conservation and management rules revived interest 
in clarifying what constituted a genuine link between flag state 
and vessel. 
The original focus of the F AO conference that led to the 
creation of the Compliance Agreement was to come to agree-
ment on means to deter re-flagging, and in fact the initial draft 
had provisions instructing a State to refuse to grant its flag to 
a fishing vessel unless it was "satisfied, in accordance with its 
own national legislation, that there exists a genuine link."" 
The draft went on to set criteria for determining such a link, 
including the nationality or residence of the owners. Dis-
agreement over how, or even whether, the new agreement 
should address issues of registration and the nature of the 
genuine link led negotiators to shift the focus of the final 
Agreement from re-flagging to flag State responsibility. 54 
50 For a thorough study of the legal interpretation of the "genuine link" require-
ments in both UNCLOS and the High Seas Convention, see Robin R. Churchill with 
Christopher Hedley, 2000, The Meaning of the "Genuine Link" Requirement in Relation 
to the Nationality of Ships, study prepared for the International Transport Workers 
Federation, available at http://www.oceanlaw.netlhedley/pubs/ITF -Oct2000. pdf (last 
visited March 17, 2004). 
51 Id. at 13. 
52 UNCLOS Art. 91 deals with nationality of ships; Art. 94 as noted above ad-
dresses flag State duties . 
.. Draft Agreement on the Flagging of Vessels Fishing on the High Seas to Pro-
mote Compliance with Internationally Agreed Conservation and Management Meas-
ures, Art. IVO) (FAO Document COFII93110, Annex 2). 
54 David A. Balton, "The Compliance Agreement," Developments in International 
Fisheries Law, 31 (Ellen Hey, ed. 1999). 
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As noted above, the Compliance Agreement deals with the 
issuance of an authorization to fish on the high seas and the 
elaboration of the duties of the flag state granting that authori-
zation. Its only remaining nod to the "genuine link" require-
ment is in Article lips where flag States are directed to assess 
their ability to exercise control over their vessels before issuing 
authorizations to fish on the high seas. 
It remains, however, that meaningful flag State control is 
very difficult where vessels operate far from the flag state and 
may, in fact, never have any contact with the territory or offi-
cials of the flag state. As one author notes, in appearing to 
sidestep the "genuine link" issue, focusing instead on the issue 
of flag State responsibility, international law leaves consider-
able room for flag of convenience fishing vessels to undermine 
international conservation and management efforts with im-
punity. Unless international fisheries instruments are widely 
implemented, the problems identified at the root of IUD fishing 
remain.56 
IV. REGIONAL INITIATIVES 
At the same time the international community was realiz-
ing the need to build on the general provisions in UNCLOS to 
elaborate a new regime for international fisheries, regional 
fisheries management organizations (hereinafter "RFMOs") 
began to develop their own initiatives. Efforts to bolster con-
servation and management measures went hand-in-hand with 
a push to compel all states fishing for the stocks under their 
purview to comply. 
From the beginning, the focus of their efforts were the ves-
sels of non-contracting parties, specifically those flagged to 
states offering open registries and little oversight or control. 
Two types of mechanisms have evolved within the various 
RFMOs: trade-based measures that attempt to limit access to 
markets of IUD-caught fish, and enforcement-based measures 
55 S ee supra note 38. 
56 A. Van Houtte, 2003, "Flag State Responsibility and the Contribution of Re-
cent International Instruments in Preventing, Deterring, and Eliminating IUU Fish-
ing," as presented to the Expert Consultation on Fishing Vessels Operating Under 
Open Registries and their Impact on megal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing, 
Miami, Fl. 23 - 25 Sept. 2003, FAD Fisheries Report No. 722, 59 (on file with the au-
thor). 
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that establish a presumption of illegal fishing and mandate 
inspections and other enforcement actions to prevent IUU-
caught fish from being landed. 
In general, trade-based measures have been most widely 
used where either the final market or the area of the fishery for 
the fish products in question are very limited. Enforcement-
based measures were originally developed in RFMOs where 
either the market patterns or the nature of the fisheries them-
selves are too complicated to allow easy trade tracking. 
As the problems of IUU fishing have continued to grow, 
more and more RFMOs have expanded the tools at their dis-
posal to combat them. Most RFMOs are now moving towards 
an integrated suite of both trade-based and enforcement-based 
measures to prevent fishing by non-members. Further, as dif-
ferent RFMOs have had some success in halting IUU fishing by 
non-members, there is an even bigger priority being placed on 
equivalent measures to address problems caused by members' 
fleets. 
1. ICCAT 
The International Commission for the Conservation of At-
lantic Tunas (hereinafter "ICCAT") was the first RFMO to 
tackle the problems of non-member fishing in a comprehensive 
way. At its 1991 Annual Meeting, the Commission had noted 
the presence of many non-member vessels targeting ICCAT-
managed stocks, particularly Western Atlantic bluefin tuna.57 
Many of these vessels were flagged to States with open regis-
tries, such as Panama, Honduras, and Belize, who maintained 
little or no control over the fishing vessels flying their flag. At 
the time, scientific advice showing that bluefin tuna stocks 
were continuing to decline58 also led ICCAT to adopt a four-year 
57 Hoping to curb this non-member fishing, ICCAT adopted 91-2, "Resolution by 
ICCAT Concerning Catches of Bluefin Tuna by Non-Contracting Parties," which called 
for developing comprehensive management policies designed to improve reporting and 
ensure ICCAT compliance through standardizing statistical reporting and an interna-
tional trade monitoring system. The new policies were also to include "other measures 
... consistent with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)." 
58 The situation was so bad that, shortly after the 1991 ICCAT meeting, Sweden 
announced its plans to introduce a proposal to list Atlantic bluefin tuna under the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna 
(CITES). See Report of the Eighth Conference of the Parties, Kyoto, Japan, March 1992. 
Sweden's proposal would have recommended that Western Atlantic bluefin tuna be 
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"enhancement" of current management measures for western 
Atlantic bluefin tuna, as a first step toward a recovery program 
for that stock:9 Given the high levels of fishing by non-
members - estimates at the time indicated approximately 
twenty percent of total landings of north Atlantic bluefin tuna 
came from vessels of non-membersso - there was a clear reali-
zation that the proposed restrictions on harvests by ICCAT 
parties would be insufficient without a accompanying reduction 
in non-member fishing. 
ICCAT followed up in 1992 by taking two steps towards 
exerting control over non-member fishing. The first was the 
establishment of a system to track trade of frozen bluefin tuna. 
The Bluefin Tuna Statistical Document Program61 required any 
bluefin tuna product imported into the territory of a Contract-
ing Party to be accompanied by a document that, among others, 
indicated the country issuing the document, names of the im-
porter and exporter, and the area of harvest. The document 
had to be validated by a government official of the flag state of 
the vessel that harvested the tuna:· In requiring all imports 
into ICCAT member countries to be documented, it effectively 
bound even non-members to comply with ICCAT. The vast ma-
jority of Atlantic bluefin tuna entering trade is destined for 
ICCAT member - country markets. Japan alone is the recipient 
of more than ninety percent of the total Atlantic blue fin tuna in 
listed on CITES Appendix I, which would have prevented all international trade, and 
Eastern Atlantic bluefin tuna (assessed to be in slightly better shape) be listed on 
CITES Appendix II, which, among other restrictions, would have required all trade to 
be documented and tracked. It was withdrawn before it could come to a vote. 
59 91_1, "Recommendation by ICCAT (Made in 1991) for the Enhancement of the 
Current Management of Western Atlantic Bluefin Tuna." In its 1992 bluefin tuna 
stock assessment, the scientific body ofICCAT estimated that Western Atlantic bluefin 
tuna populations had fallen to about ten percent of their 1975 levels. 
so See Report of the ICCAT Standing Committee on Research and Statistics, 155 
(1992). 
61 92_1, "Recommendation by ICCAT Concerning the ICCAT Bluefin Tuna Statis-
tical Document Program." The requirement was originally limited to frozen products 
only, then expanded to fresh bluefin tuna the following year. See 93-3, "Recommenda-
tion by ICCAT Concerning the Implementation of the ICCAT Bluefin Tuna Statistical 
Document Program on Fresh Products." 
6. This was later expanded to include designated non-governmental institutions, 
but only for members of the Commission "in good standing" who provided ICCAT-
required statistical information. See 93-1 "Resolution by ICCAT Concerning Validation 
by a Government Official of the Bluefin Tuna Statistical Document." 
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trade63 - so non-contracting parties who did not utilize the sta-
tistical document effectively lost access to all international 
markets. Implementation of the statistical document therefore 
gave the first clear picture of the true levels of both member 
and non-member fishing for blue fin tuna, and, most usefully, 
allowed ICCAT to identify which non-member countries were 
fishing at levels that could jeopardize ICCAT's attempts to 
manage the stocks. 
The second innovation of the 1992 ICCAT Annual Meeting 
was the creation of a new subsidiary body to administer and 
oversee the new statistical document program and, more gen-
erally, track fishing by non-members and make recommenda-
tions to ICCAT based upon its review. The terms of reference 
also included a specific mandate "to consider and outlining 
measures to prevent the re-flagging of vessels of Contracting 
Parties for the purpose of avoiding fisheries management 
measures established by the Commission."64 In its 1991 resolu-
tion concerning non-contracting party fishing,65 ICCAT had al-
ready noted that problems in data collection and stock assess-
ment had been exacerbated by a significant number of contract-
ing party vessels re-flagging to non-member states. Many of 
the subsequent measures ICCAT developed therefore had the 
effect of bringing those contracting parties' vessels that had 
attempted to evade ICCAT by re-flagging to open registries 
back into compliance with ICCAT. 
With a way to track trade and a better understanding of 
the quantities and origins of much of the unreported catch, 
ICCAT fulfilled the final mandate of the 1991 resolution with 
its 1994 adoption of the Bluefin Tuna Action Plan.66 The action 
plan established a process by which ICCAT identified States 
whose vessels fished for Atlantic bluefin tuna "in a manner 
which diminishes the effectiveness" of ICCAT conservation and 
63 According to 2002 Bluefin Tuna Statistical Document data, Japan imported 
almost ninety-five percent of all Atlantic bluefin tuna tracked by the program. Other 
importers include the United States, the European Union, and Korea. 
64 92-2, "Resolution by ICCAT to Establish a Permanent Working Group for the 
Improvement of ICCAT Statistics and Conservation Measures and the Terms of Refer-
ence of the Working Group." 
65 See supra at note 57. 
66 93-2 "Resolution by ICCAT on the Bluefin Tuna Action Plan." 
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management measures.67 ICCAT was to request the identified 
States to rectify the situation. If, in the next year, the vessels 
continued to undermine ICCAT, the action plan allowed ICCAT 
to recommend that its Contracting Parties take additional 
measures, including multilateral import restrictions, on bluefin 
tuna products from the flag State. 
The very next year, ICCAT identified Panama, Belize, and 
Honduras68 under the new plan and, in 1996, agreed to impose 
trade sanctions against all three. After a parallel scheme cov-
ering Atlantic swordfish was adopted in 1995,69 these same 
three states were identified as undermining ICCAT's swordfish 
management efforts as well. Belize and Honduras were even-
tually subject to import bans on Atlantic swordfish.70 
These actions had immediate effects. In 1995, when it was 
first identified under the Bluefin Tuna Action Plan, Panama 
had almost 600 fishing vessels on its registry. By 1999, the 
year that sanctions were lifted upon Panama's joining ICCAT 
that number had fallen by almost 60 percent.7l Largely in re-
sponse to ICCAT's actions, Panama issued new regulations 
regulating the issuance of international fishing licenses and 
establishing grounds for cancellation of the license, including 
"proven violation of the conservation and management meas-
ures of regional and sub-regional fishery organizations."" 
In that same period, there were two other important de-
velopments. The first was a surge in fishing vessels registered 
67 This standard comes from the Pelly Amendment to the Fisherman's Protective 
Act of 1971 (22 U.S.C. 1978), which directs the required the Secretary of Commerce to 
determine if nationals of a foreign country are diminishing the effectiveness of an in-
ternational fishery conservation program; such a determination can lead to import 
prohibitions on fish products from the offending nation. The UN Fish Stocks Agree-
ment utilized similar language ("undermine the effectiveness" vice "diminish") in its 
call for States to ensure their fishing activities are consistent with subregional or re-
gional conservation and management measures. See Article 17 at para. 4. 
68 96-11, "Recommendation by ICCAT Regarding Belize and Honduras Pursuant 
to the 1994 Bluefin Tuna Action Plan" and 96-12, "Recommendation by ICCAT Concerning 
Panama Pursuant to the 1994 Bluefin Tuna Action Plan." 
69 95_13, "Resolution by ICCAT Concerning an Action Plan to Ensure the Effec-
tiveness of the Conservation Program for Atlantic Swordfish." 
70 99_8, "Recommendation by ICCAT Regarding Belize and Honduras Pursuant 
to the 1995 Swordfish Action Plan Resolution." Although Panama was identified with 
Belize and Honduras under the Swordfish Action Plan in 1998, it had joined the Com-
mission by the 1999 ICCAT annual meeting and therefore was no longer subject to the 
action plans. 
7l SOFIA at Figure 37,66. 
7. Panamanian Executive Decree No. 49 (of 13 November 1997), Article 7. 
18
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol34/iss3/3
2004] CONTROL BEGINS AT HOME 515 
to Belize, inversely proportional to the decline in Panama's reg-
istry.73 The second was a sharp increase in unreported catches 
of some other ICCAT-managed species, particularly bigeye 
tuna." As Panama began to impose discipline on its registry, 
and as markets for bluefin tuna were closed to the three big-
gest non-member fleets, IUU vessels sought either a new flag, a 
new fishery, or both. 
Recognizing that, particularly in the case of highly mobile 
large-scale longline vessels, stock-specific measures merely 
routed the IUU fleet into new fisheries, ICCAT adopted a new 
measure in 1998 to identify States - ICCAT members or non-
members alike - whose large scale longline vessels under-
mined the effectiveness of ICCAT conservation and manage-
ment measures.75 As with the action plans, the new resolution 
could eventually result in the imposition of trade restrictions, 
but in this case, the sanctions could apply to any species 
ICCAT identified as being harmed by the fishing activities in 
question. To facilitate its application, the UU Catches Resolu-
tion instructed ICCAT members to submit to the Commission 
information on vessels supplying imports of frozen tuna or 
swordfish. 
ICCAT adopted its first list of IUU vessels pursuant to the 
UU Catches Resolution at its 1999 Annual Meeting.76 It in-
cluded 345 longline vessels, the vast majority of which were 
flagged to Belize, Honduras, Equatorial Guinea, and St. Vin-
cent and the Grenadines. By 2002, the list totaled 378, but for 
fully 222 of those, the current flag was unknown. Once again, 
vessels were fleeing the registries of states under sanction and 
moving to another open registry.77 Further, a Japanese analy-
sis of import data, comparing alleged vessel catch rates and 
73 S ee supra note 71. 
,. See Report of the ICCAT Standing Committee on Research and Statistics 
(2003), BET Fig. 2,31. 
75 98_18, "Resolution by ICCAT Concerning the Unreported and Unregulated 
Catches of Tunas by Large-Scale Longline Vessels in the Convention Area" [hereinafter 
UU Catches Resolutionl. 
76 ICCAT, Report for the Biennial Period 1998-99, Part II (1999) - Vol. 1, Appen-
dix 11 to Annex 7. 
77 Belize, Bolivia, Cambodia, Equatorial Guinea, Georgia, Honduras, Sierra 
Leone, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines have each been sanctioned under this reso-
lution; sanctions have subsequently been lifted from Belize, Honduras, and St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines. 
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ownership connections, showed that some vessel owners were 
"laundering" catch made by one vessel flagged to a state under 
sanction to another of the company's vessels under a "clean" 
flag. 78 
Clearly, actions focused at the flag State level were not 
enough to tackle IUD fishing in such a fluid environment. To 
counter, ICCAT adopted two vessel-based initiatives in 2002. 
The ICCAT Positive Lise" built upon an existing call for all 
ICCAT members to submit lists of their vessels over twenty-
four meters licensed to fish in the ICCAT Convention Area for 
stocks under ICCAT's purview. The new recommendation 
however, was a binding measure that included clear require-
ments for flag states to maintain control over and a connection 
to the vessels it submitted to the record - in effect setting up 
an ICCAT-specific "genuine link." It also instructed ICCAT 
members to take measures "to prohibit the fishing for, the re-
taining on board, the transshipment and landing" of tuna from 
vessels not on the record,so and only to validate statistical 
documents for listed vessels. As the statistical document pro-
gram had been expanded to include swordfish and bigeye tuna 
the year before, this effectively meant that, for the three high-
est-valued ICCAT stocks, no product caught by non-contracting 
parties to ICCAT could enter trade. 
This measure was complemented by the adoption of a 
Negative List81 that built upon the IUD list instituted under 
the UD Catches Resolution. In addition to formalizing the 
process for compiling the list each year, this recommendation 
instructed ICCAT members to, inter alia, prohibit landings, 
transshipment, and imports from vessels on the list. Although 
the Negative List initially includes only large-scale vessels of 
non-contracting parties, it is intended to be expanded to all 
vessels and all States in the next year. 
78 See ICCAT, Report for the Biennial Period 2002-03, Part [ (2002) - Vol. 1, Ap-
pendix 1 to Annex 12. 
7" 02-22, "Recommendation by ICCAT Concerning the Establishment of an 
ICCAT Record of Vessels over 24 Meters Authorized to Operate in the Convention 
Area." so [d. at paragraph 7 a). 
81 02_23, "Recommendation by ICCAT to Establish a List of Vessels Presumed to 
Have Carried Out Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing Activities in the 
ICCAT Convention Area." 
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Finally, at its most recent annual meeting, ICCAT adopted 
a new, comprehensive measure that replaced the Bluefin Tuna 
Action Plan, the Swordfish Action Plan, and the UU Catches 
Resolution."2 The new resolution sets a single process for en-
forcing all ICCAT conservation and management measures, 
replacing the piecemeal approach to using trade as a compli-
ance tool that evolved over the past decade. It applies to both 
ICCAT members and non-members - members can be identi-
fied for not "taking measures or exercising effective control to 
ensure compliance with ICCAT conservation and management 
measures by the vessels flying their flag" and non-members are 
held to a similar standard, based on their obligation not to un-
dermine the effectiveness of ICCAT measures. In so doing, it 
overcomes one of the biggest weaknesses of the old regime; 
there was no way to continue sanctions imposed under the for-
mer Action Plans once the sanctioned State joined ICCAT.83 
Most significantly, it gives binding effect to non-members' duty 
to cooperate enunciated in the Fish Stocks Agreement and 
UNCLOS before it. 
2. Other Tuna Organizations 
Other organizations whose mandate include highly-
migratory stocks, such as the Commission for the Conservation 
of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT), the Indian Ocean Tuna 
Commission (lOTC), and the Inter-American Tropical Tuna 
Commission (IATTC), have taken a similar approach to ICCAT 
in recent years. All three have adopted some kind of statistical 
document program84 coupled with a positive listing scheme 
82 03_15, "Resolution by ICCAT Concerning Trade Measures," available at 
http://www.iccat.es/Documents/Recs/Recs2003/2003-15-e.pdf (last visited March 17, 
2004). 
83 When Panama became a contracting party in late 1998, ICCAT lifted the sanc-
tions imposed under the Bluefin Tuna Action Plan, which applied only to non-
contracting parties. At the time, several ICCAT members expressed serious concerns 
that Panama had not, in fact, rectified the problems that led to the sanctions. Indeed, 
in 2001 ICCAT identified Panama under the UU Catches Resolution after noting that a 
number of fishing vessels deleted from Panama's registry had returned and appeared 
to be undermining ICCAT's bigeye tuna measures. 
84 See CCSBT "Southern Bluefin Tuna Statistical Document Program", Attach-
ment J to the Report of the Sixth Meeting (Second Part) of the CCSBT, March 2000; 
IOTC "Resolution 01106 Concerning the IOTC Bigeye Tuna Statistical Document Pro-
gramme"; IATTC C-03-01 "Resolution on IATTC Bigeye Tuna Statistical Document 
Program." 
21
Warner-Kramer: Control Begins at Home
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2004
518 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34 
nearly identical to that of ICCAT for vessels over twenty-four 
meters in length.8s The result of this coordination is that, with 
the exception of those in the Central and Western Pacific 
Ocean, most bluefin and bigeye tuna fisheries and all major 
markets are off-limits to states who are not members of the 
relevant RFMO. When the Convention on the Conservation 
and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the West-
ern and Central Pacific Ocean88 enters into force, this loophole 
will close. 
To date, only CCSBT has also adopted a scheme to impose 
trade-restrictive measures on non-members whose vessels are 
identified as catching southern bluefin tuna in a manner that 
diminishes the effectiveness of the relevant conservation and 
management measures.87 Since its adoption in 2000, CCSBT 
has identified Belize, Cambodia, Honduras, Seychelles, and 
Equatorial Guinea under the plan, but has not moved to the 
imposition of trade sanctions against any of these states. 
3. North Atlantic 
The Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) 
was plagued by a serious non-member fishing problem from 
shortly after its inception in 1979. From the mid-1980s to the 
early 1990s, more than 30 non-member vessels were spotted in 
the NAFO Regulatory Area each year; most of these were 
flagged to open registry States such as Panama, Honduras, and 
Sierra Leone.88 This coincided with the organization contem-
plating drastic cutbacks in key groundfish fisheries like cod as 
many of the major NAFO stocks began to flounder. 
85 See CCSBT "Resolution megal, Unregulated and Unreported Fishing (IUD) 
and Establishment of a CCSBT Record of Vessels over 24 Meters Authorized to Fish for 
Southern Bluefin Tuna", Attachment 10 to Appendix 3 of the Report of the Tenth Meet· 
ing of the CCSBT, October 2003; IOTC "Resolution 02105 Concerning the Establish-
ment of an IOTC Record of Vessels over 24 Metres Authorised to Operate in the IOTC 
Area"; IATTC C-03-07 "Resolution on the Establishment of a List of Longline Fishing 
Vessels over 24 Meters (LSTLFVs) Authorized to Operate in the Eastern Pacific 
Ocean." 
88 Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, done at Honolulu 5 September 2000. 
87 CCSBT "Action Plan", Attachment I to the Report of the Sixth Meeting (Second 
Part) of the CCSBT, March 2000. 
88 See Annual Report of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization, 1985-93. 
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In 1990, NAFO established a new body to monitor non-
member fishing and identify options to address the problem. 
The terms of reference for this group included both a call to 
prevent the re-flagging of NAFO member vessels to fish under 
the flags of non -contracting parties and to examine means to 
control imports of fish caught by non-members.89 That same 
year, NAFO also adopted a resolution requesting its members 
to deal directly with non-contracting parties fishing in NAFO 
waters, both through diplomatic channels and by taking "effec-
tive measures to reduce the benefits of any fishing activities" of 
those States' vessels. The resolution also contemplated the de-
velopment of a certificate to accompany imports of all NAFO-
managed stocks taken by non-contracting parties indicating 
the fish were not harvested within the NAFO area.90 
NAFO fisheries tend to be mixed - a certain percentage of 
bycatch of other species are expected in most cases - and are 
traded in a wide range of markets. The logistics of implement-
ing a catch certification scheme or trying to control imports in 
the NAFO context were too complicated. Rather than focus on 
trade as the primary tool for compliance, as ICCAT had done, 
NAFO instead built upon the port state control provisions of 
the Compliance Agreement and the Fish Stocks Agreement. 
The resulting non-contracting party scheme,91 adopted in 1997, 
first set a presumption that any non-contracting party vessel 
sighted fishing in the NAFO Regulatory Area, or receiving 
transshipped fish from any such vessel, is undermining the 
effectiveness of NAFO conservation and management meas-
ures. The sighting information is then disseminated quickly to 
all NAFO members and to the flag state, and if the vessel en-
ters the port of any NAFO member it is subject to port inspec-
tion and barred from landing or transshipping its fish unless it 
can demonstrate it was not caught in the Regulatory Area. 
Implementation of the Scheme, coupled with a continua-
tion of the diplomatic contacts between NAFO members and 
89 See NAFO Proposal 3/90, "Proposal for Establishment of the Standing Com-
mittee on Fishing Activity of Non-Contracting Parties on the Regulatory Area 
(STACFAC)." 
90 1190, "Resolution of the General Council of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries 
Organization on non-NAFO Fishing Activities, adopted by the General Council on 14 
September 1990." 
91 "Scheme to Promote Compliance by Non-Contracting Party Vessels with the 
Conservation and Enforcement Measures Established by NAFO," NAFO/GC Doc. 97/6. 
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the flag states of non-contracting party vessels, led to a signifi-
cant drop-off in sightings. In 2000 and 2001, no non-member 
vessels at all were seen fishing in the Regulatory Area. But in 
2002, sightings resumed, this time in a newly-developed oce-
anic redfish fishery shared by the North-East Atlantic Fisher-
ies Commission (NEAFC):2 NEAFC had adopted an identical 
non-contracting party scheme in 1999,93 and, as the same ves-
sels were seen fishing in both areas, NAFO and NEAFC agreed 
to share sighting information under the schemes. 
Concern over the apparent resurgence of non-contracting 
party fishing revived an interest in implementing additional 
trade restrictive measures in NAFO and NEAFC. While NAFO 
considered such a proposal at its 2003 meeting and will work 
on it further in 2004,94 NEAFC adopted a revised non-
contracting party scheme at its annual meeting in November 
2003:5 This new measure, which replaces the former scheme, 
maintains its predecessor's presumption applied to sighted 
non-member vessels and prohibitions on landings and trans-
shipments from those vessels following a port inspection. All 
sighted vessels are now also placed on an "IUU vessel list" to be 
publicized on the NEAFC website, and NEAFC parties are to, 
inter alia, prohibit imports of any fish, whether or not caught 
under NEAFC's jurisdiction, from vessels on the list. The 
scheme takes the final step of providing for trade restrictive 
measures on the flag states of listed vessels if they do not rec-
tify the fishing activities of their vessels. 
4. CCAMLR 
The fisheries managed by the Commission for the Conser-
vation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) are 
among the hardest to control and the most tempting for lUU 
fishers to exploit. The size and isolation of the CCAMLR con-
vention area - encompassing vast areas of the southern ocean 
92 See NAFO Meeting Proceedings 2002, Part III, Report of the Standing Commit-
tee on Fishing Activity of Non-Contracting Parties on the Regulatory Area, 343 - 347. 
93 "Scheme to Promote Compliance by Non-Contracting Party Vessels with Rec-
ommendations Established by NEAFC," adopted November 1998. 
94 See NAFO, Report of the General Council, 25'h Annual Meeting, 15 - 19 Sep-
tember 2003, NAFO/GC Doc. 03/3, 70 and Annex 6. (Advance copy, on file with the 
author) 
95 NEAFC Doc. AM 2003/34, in force 1 January 2004. (On file with the author) 
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- makes traditional enforcement impossible. The chief fish 
stocks under CCAMLR's purview, Patagonian toothfish and 
Antarctic toothfish, only began being widely commercially ex-
ploited in the early 1990s,96 but by 1995 the unreported catch 
was estimated to be at least equal to if not more than legal 
catches.97 Once again, a major source of the IUU fishing was 
flag of convenience vessels from states such as Panama and 
Belize, and in particular vessels either owned by firms in 
CCAMLR member states but flagged elsewhere or reflagged to 
non-member states to avoid compliance with CCAMLR meas-
ures.98 In this instance there were also significant numbers of 
vessels from CCAMLR member countries like Russia and Uru-
guay fishing illegally.99 
Two years later, CCAMLR members called for additional 
action to improve compliance with conservation and manage-
ment measures by both members and non-members. The first 
measures focused on strengthening the ability of members to 
control their own fleets , 100 and included mandatory licensing'°l 
and mandatory use of satellite tracking systemsl02 on all mem-
ber vessels fishing in the CCAMLR zone. But CCAMLR also 
adopted a non-contracting party scheme.103 Like the NAFO 
Scheme adopted the same year, this measure established a 
presumption that non-contracting party vessels sighted fishing 
in the CCAMLR convention area were undermining CCAMLR 
conservation and management measures, required a port in-
spection of any sighted vessels, and allowed members to pro-
hibit landings or transshipments of toothfish found on board. 
96 Mary Lack and Glenn Sant, 2001, "Patagonian Toothfish: Are Conservation 
and Trade Measures Working?" TRAFFIC Bulletin Vol. 19 No.1, 3. 
97 CCAMLR, 1995, Report of the Fourteenth Meeting of the Commission, 11. 
98 Richard Herr, "The International Regulation on Patagonian Toothfish: 
CCAMLR and High Seas Management," 316 (Olav Schram Stokke, ed. 2001). 
99 See, e.g .. CCAMLR, 2002, Report of the Twenty-First Meeting of the Commis-
sion, Annex 5, Report of the Standing Committee on Observation and Inspection. 
100 H err, supra note 98, at note 53. 
101 Conservation Measure 10-02 (2001) "Licensing and Inspection Obligations of 
Contracting Parties with regard to their Flag Vessels Operating in the Convention 
Area," originally adopted in 1997 as Conservation Measure 119/XVI. 
102 Conservation Measure 10-04 (2002) "Automated Satellite-Linked Vessel 
Monitoring Systems (VMS)", originally adopted in 1997 as Resolution 121XV1. 
103 Conservation Measure 10-07 (2002) "Scheme to Promote Compliance by Non-
Contracting Party Vessels with CCAMLR Conservation Measures," originally adopted 
in 1997 as Conservation Measure 118/XVI. 
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Estimates of unreported catch began to fall after the im-
plementation of these measures/04 but CCAMLR's most effec-
tive innovation to combat IUD fishing was the introduction of 
its Catch Documentation Scheme (hereinafter "CDS") in 2000. '05 
Unlike the tuna statistical documents adopted in ICCAT and 
elsewhere, which only attached to a product once it entered 
trade, the CDS covers all harvests of toothfish from CCAMLR 
waters from the moment it comes on board. Vessels must fill in 
a catch document for every harvest of toothfish to be landed or 
transshipped and report the particulars of its trip and catches 
to the flag State. The flag State then verifies if each harvest is 
consistent with the vessel's fishing authorization; only ship-
ments accompanied by a catch document thus confirmed can be 
landed, transshipped or imported into member States. The 
CDS, like the tuna tracking programs, serves to close the major 
markets to illegally-caught fish, but it also affords members 
more effective control of landings and, more importantly, 
transshipments from their own vessels. 
In recent years, CCAMLR has also strengthened its meas-
ures that deal with problem vessels. First, the non-contracting 
party scheme was modified in 2002 to create an IUD list con-
taining the vessels sighted or denied landing or transshipment 
under the scheme. Second, CCAMLR adopted a new scheme 
the same year that established an IUD list of contracting party 
vessels as well. '06 In both instances, CCAMLR members may 
now prohibit imports, as well as landings and transshipments, 
from listed vessels and further may agree to impose trade sanc-
tions on the flag states if they fail to rectify their vessels' illegal 
fishing activities. Notably, the language of the new measures, 
which build upon the original ICCAT model, is virtually identi-
cal to that just adopted in NEAFC and under consideration in 
NAFO. 
104 TRAFFIC Bulletin, supra note 96, 7. 
105 Conservation Measure 10·05 (2002) "Catch Documentation Scheme for Dissos-
tichus spp.," originally adopted in 1999 as Conservation Measure 170IXVIII. 
106 Conservation Measure 10-06 (2002), "Scheme to Promote Compliance by Con-
tracting Party Vessels with CCAMLR Conservation Measures." 
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V. NATIONAL EFFORTS 
Recognizing that a large number of Japan- and Taiwan-
built longline vessels had reflagged in the 1990's, Japan under-
took to facilitate a program with Taiwan whereby these vessels 
were either rolled back into Taiwan registry or scrapped. With 
the backing of its government, a Japanese industry group 
called the Organization for the Promotion of Responsible Tuna 
Fisheries (hereinafter "OPRT"), concluded an agreement with 
Taiwan's FOC Fishing Vessels Association to scrap up to sixty-
two Japanese-built former flag of convenience longliners by the 
end of 2002 and re-register sixty-seven longliners to Taiwan by 
the end of 2005. 107 As part of the arrangement, Taiwan agreed 
to absorb the re-registered vessels without increasing the total 
number of its tuna longline vessels currently in operation. The 
program got off to a slow start, but as of November 2003, Japan 
had scrapped forty-three former flag of convenience vessels and 
Taiwan had accepted forty-seven back to its registry. In addi-
tion, Japan negotiated a Cooperative Management Framework 
with Vanuatu and Seychelles to take an additional sixty-nine 
former flag of convenience longline vessels onto their registries, 
where they are now bound to comply with relevant conserva-
tion and management measures. lOB 
Following the imposition of trade sanctions by ICCAT 
members, both Belize and St. Vincent and the Grenadines en-
acted a series of regulatory and legislative changes to gain 
greater control over their respective registries. By October 
2002, Belize could report to ICCAT that it had deregistered 513 
fishing vessels in the previous yearl09 and had created a new 
high seas fisheries licensing regime110 modeled on the principles 
of the Compliance Agreement and IPOA-IUU. The new law 
established a fisheries administration to work with Belize's 
registration agency to administer the granting of fishing li-
censes, maintain catch reporting, and oversee enforcement. All 
107 OPRT Press Release 2001106/01 (on file with the author). 
lOB "Report on the Progress in the Measures to Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated Large-Scale Tuna Longline Fishing Vessels" Submitted by Japan to the 
18th Regular Meeting of ICCAT, November 2003, ICCAT Working Doc. No. PWG-051 
(on file with the author). 
109 Submission by the Observer from Belize to the PWG, Appendix 3 to Annex 11 
of ICCAT, Report for the Biennial Period 2002-03, Part I (2002) - Voll. 
110 See Belize High Seas Fishing Act, 31 January 2003. 
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vessels fishing on the high seas must be authorized and, as of 
October 2003, must complete and submit detailed catch and 
effort reports. In 2003 sightings of Belizean vessels, fishing 
illegally showed a dramatic drop across the board/H and ICCAT 
agreed to allow sanctions on Belize to lift as of January 1, 
2004.H2 
St. Vincent's efforts were similar.H3 In 2001, it ceased reg-
istering any new high sea fishing vessels and began to develop 
a comprehensive fisheries management administration. St. 
Vincent's revised legislation and subsequent regulations1l4 re-
quire the issuance of a high seas fishing authorization, manda-
tory satellite monitoring, observer coverage, and daily catch 
reporting. It is also developing port inspection schemes with 
agents in Trinidad and Tobago and Brazil, where the majority 
of St. Vincent's high seas fleet lands its catch, although St. 
Vincent hopes to have all of its vessels landing in its own terri-
tory when a port development project in Kingstown is complete. 
Supported by a ninety percent reduction in albacore tuna 
catches in 2002, ICCAT agreed to lift sanctions as of January 
2004.115 
Each state made statements at the time that ICCAT 
agreed to lift their respective sanctions committing to prevent 
its vessels from targeting ICCAT stocks for which it had no 
quota and to avoid registering and licensing IUU vessels. 116 St. 
Vincent's statement contained a specific undertaking to give 
"serious consideration to reduce fishing vessels owned by non-
CARICOM nationals," in line with its intention to eventually 
nationalize its fleet and have its fishing vessels land in its ter-
III See e.g., two sighted by NAFO, three on ICCAT's rrru list, and none on 
CCAMLR's. 
112 02-16, "Recommendation by ICCAT Concerning the Importation of Atlantic 
Bluefin Tuna, Atlantic Swordfish, and Atlantic Bluefin Tuna and their Products from 
Belize." 
H3 The information in this paragraph comes from statements of St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines to the 2001 to 2003 Annual Meetings ofICCAT and personal communi-
cations with the author. 
H4 Merchant Shipping Act, as amended, July 2001, High Seas Fishing Act, Sep-
tember 2001, and High Seas Fishing Regulations, published 4 November 2003. 
H5 02-20, "Recommendation by ICCAT Concerning the Trade Sanction against St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines." 
HS See "Statement of Belize," ICCAT 2003 Working Doc. PWG-134, and "State-
ment of St. Vincent and the Grenadines," ICCAT 2003 Working Doc. PWG-135 (on file 
with the author). 
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ritory. Belize on the other hand, continues to maintain an open 
registry for fishing vessels, but it is attempting to impose moni-
toring and control on these vessels from a distance through the 
use of satellite monitoring and port inspections conducted by 
contracted agents.1l7 
VI. GLOBAL FOLLOW-UP 
The IPOA-IUU was adopted in June 2001 as a comprehen-
sive "toolbox" of measures that states could take, both indi-
vidually and collectively, to address the problem of IUU fish-
ing. Among its provisions is a call for States to develop their 
own national plans of action to achieve the objectives of the 
IPOA-IUU and for FAO to biennially evaluate the progress to-
wards its implementation. Since then, F AO has hosted two 
expert consultations aimed at exploring more effective imple-
mentation of elements of the IPOA-IUU; one looked at 
strengthening port State control1l8 and the other addressed fish-
ing by open registries. 119 The former initiative would open a 
new avenue for combating IUU fishing through regional port 
state Memoranda of Understanding setting out conditions of 
entry to ports or denying access to ports by foreign fishing ves-
sels that have engaged in, or supported, IUU fishing. At its 
Twenty-fifth session in February 2003, FAD's Committee on 
Fisheries called for additional work on these issues and for 
convening a technical consultation to review overall progress 
and promote the full implementation of the IPOA-IUU; the lat-
ter session will be held in June 2004.120 
Outside the auspices of the FAD, other organizations have 
initiatives underway that could provide innovative ways to 
tackle IUU fishing in general, and the problems related to flag 
of convenience fishing in particular. The Organization for Eco-
117 Per presentation by the observer from Belize to informal sessions of the PWG 
at the 2003 ICCAT meeting, November 2003. 
118 Report of the Expert Consultation to Review Port State Measures to Combat 
megal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing - Rome, 4-6 November 2002, FAO Fisher-
ies Report No. 692. 
119 Report of the Expert Consultation on Fishing Vessels Operating Under Open 
Registries and their Impact on megal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing, Miami, 
Fl. Sep. 23-25, 2003, FAO Fisheries Report No. 722. 
120 See Report of the Twenty-fifth session of the Committee on Fisheries, Rome, 
24-28 February 2003, FAO Fisheries Report No. 702, para. 23. 
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nomic Cooperation and Development (hereinafter "OECD") is 
in the midst of a multi-year project looking at the environ-
mental, economic, and social issues and effects of IUU/flag of 
convenience fishing. This project will build upon earlier work 
that the OECD has done on the roles of subsidies and market 
dynamics in sustainable fisheries121 and will pay particular at-
tention to possible economic tools, including OECD instru-
ments governing international investment and multinational 
commercial enterprises, to address the complex business con-
nections that form the backbone of the flag of convenience fish-
ing fleet. 122 The OECD Committee on Fisheries will host a 
workshop to discuss these issues in conjunction with its 93nl 
session in April 2004. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
The continued prevalence of fishing vessels re-flagging to 
avoid compliance with international conservation and man-
agement measures, and the growing numbers of fishing vessels 
flying flags of convenience, has resuscitated interest in examin-
ing the "genuine link" requirement. Both the set of recommen-
dations emerging from the 2003 Report on the United Nations 
Open-Ended Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and Law 
of the Sea (hereinafter "UNICPOLOS") and the text of the lat-
est fisheries resolution from the UN General Assembly invite 
the "International Maritime Organization [lMO] and other 
relevant competent international organizations to study, exam-
ine and clarify the role of the "genuine link" in relation to the 
duty of flag states to exercise effective control over ships flying 
their flag, including fishing vessels.'''23 FAO and IMO have 
looked at these issues already; a 2000 joint working group 
121 See OECD, 2003, Liberalising Fisheries Markets: Scope and Effects and OECD, 
2002, Transition to Responsible Fisheries: Economic and Policy Implications. 
122 See, in particular, Ursula Wynhoven, 2003, OECD Instruments and IUU Fish-
ing, OECD Doc. AGRlF1(2003)131PART3 (on file with the author). 
123 UN General Assembly draft resolution on Oceans and the law of the sea: sus-
tainable fisheries, including through the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the 
Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 
1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and related instruments, 17 Nov. 2003 (UN Doc. 
A/58/L.18), para 22. See also United Nations, Report on the work of the United Nations 
Open-ended Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and the Law of the Sea, 26 June 
2003 (UN Doc. A/58195), para. 18 (b). 
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meeting yielded a series of items that eventually were rolled 
into the IPOA-IUU, though they did not result in any new in-
sight into the specific meaning of the "genuine link. m .. 
In some ways, however, any elaboration of global instru-
ments in this regard is becoming increasingly irrelevant. As 
noted above, recent measures adopted within RFMOs to ad-
dress IUU fishing are virtually identical from one organization 
to the next. Almost all bluefin and bigeye tuna fisheries are 
covered (or will be covered) by very similar statistical document 
programs that are implemented through positive vessel listing 
schemes. And most RFMOs with responsibility for straddling 
and highly migratory fish stocks have implemented similar 
provisions that allow the imposition of trade sanctions on both 
the vessels on an agreed IUU list and, eventually, their flag 
States.125 Although, as FAO notes, RFMOs are not supra-
national entities,126 their scope of application has proven to be 
broader than the global treaties. Many states are members or 
participants in these bodies who have yet to become party to 
the Compliance Agreement or Fish Stocks Agreement - yet 
even these non-parties are now effectively bound by the provi-
sions of those treaties as implemented through the RFMOs. 
Certification programs such as the tuna statistical documents 
and CCAMLR's CDS extend the influence of RFMOs to all par-
ticipants in the respective fisheries, member or not. 127 
124 "Report of the Joint FAOIIMO Ad Hoc Working Group on megal, Unreported 
and Unregulated Fishing and Related Matters", Rome, 9 - 11 October 2000, FAD Fish-
eries Report No. 937. 
125 In all cases, the measures adopted within RFMOs instruct their contracting 
parties to adopt trade restrictive measures consist with domestic law and international 
obligations. This allows each State to make the determination, before imposing such 
sanctions, whether they are consistent with the principles of the 1994 General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (33 ILM 1153) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
To date, no WTO challenges have been raised to sanctions imposed under ICCAT's 
trade measures. The WTO Appellate Body in 2001 upheld that, under Article XX (g) of 
the GATT trade measures can legitimately be used to support conservation goals, as 
long as they are non-discriminatory and applied transparently. See Report of the Ap-
pellate Body: United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Prod-
ucts - Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, AB-2001-4, 22 Oct. 2001, 
WTIDS58/ABIRW. 
126 FAO, Progress Report to the Thirty-second Session on the Implementation of 
the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate megal, Unreported 
and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing, FAO Doc. C 2003/21, 2. 
127 As an example of the potential for RFMO measures to have even broader ap-
plication, the 12th Conference of the Parties of CITES adopted a recommendation in 
2002 that all 164 Parties adopt the CCAMLR CDS "and implement requirements for 
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Paradoxically, with the entry into force of the Compliance 
Agreement and Fish Stocks Agreement, there will likely be an 
even greater shift towards seeking solutions to global fisheries 
problems through RFMOs. As a first step in an effort to estab-
lish an integrated monitoring and control regime, ICCAT 
adopted measures at its 2003 Annual Meeting laying out a 
binding set of flag State duties. l28 The language tracks closely 
with that in Article III of the Compliance Agreement and the 
Flag State Duties section of the IPOA-IUU - as a result, even 
ICCAT members not party to the Compliance Agreement are 
now bound by its key flag state requirements. This is not just a 
symbolic requirement; the new comprehensive trade measures 
scheme adopted at the same meeting allows ICCAT to enforce 
these duties, as any compliance measure, through trade sanc-
tions ifnecessary.'29 Further, with the deposit of instruments of 
ratification of the Fish Stocks Agreement by the European 
Community and all fifteen current member states at the end of 
2003, the number of states overall, and major fishing states in 
particular, bound by that treaty's mutual boarding and inspec-
tion and other compliance provisions is now significant. l30 Still, 
it remains that almost none of the most notorious flag of con-
venience countries have ratified either instrument, though Be-
lize for one has expressed an intention to do SO.131 
With its calls for action by individual states, RFMOs, and 
the international community as a whole, the IPOA-IUU points 
the way forward to gain control over flag of convenience fish-
ing. If states implement the elements of the plan regarding 
verification in all cases where specimens of these species are introduced into or ex-
ported from or transit through the territory under their jurisdiction." See Resolution 
Conf 12.4, "Cooperation between CITES and the Commission for the Conservation of 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources regarding trade in toothfish." 
128 03-12, "Recommendation by ICCAT Concerning the Duties of Contracting 
Parties and Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties, Entities, or Fishing Entities in Rela-
tion to their Vessels Fishing in the ICCAT Convention Area," available at 
http://www.iccat.es/Documents/Recs/Recs2003/2003-12-e.pdf (last visited March 17, 
2004). 129 See supra note 82. 
130 As of December 31, 2003, fifty States and the European Community have 
ratified or acceded to the Fish Stocks Agreement. This number will grow to at least 
sixty following the expansion of the EC in 2004 by ten more member States, and their 
subsequent accession to the Agreement. See United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs 
and Law of the Sea, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chrono-
logicaUists_oCratifications.org (last visited March 17, 2004). 
131 Supra note 109. Belize is a signatory to the Fish Stocks Agreement. 
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control over their vessels and (perhaps more importantly) their 
markets and their ports, and RFMOs give effect to the call in 
the Fish Stocks Agreement to take necessary measures to en-
sure cooperation in the conservation and management of 
shared fisheries resources, IUU vessels will find it harder to 
evade agreed rules no matter where they are flagged. A key 
element will be information exchange, both through the F AO 
as established in the Compliance Agreement and through coor-
dinated enforcement efforts like the MCS Network.132 As one 
author notes, "we will never be able to assess the effectiveness 
of our attempts to eliminate IUU fishing unless we have a 
global IUU monitoring program that can tell us whether what 
we are doing is having any effect."I33 
132 The International Monitoring, Control and Surveillance Network for Fisheries-
Related Activities (MCS Network) is a network of enforcement professionals who agree 
to cooperate and coordinate in the direct exchange of fisheries MCS information and 
experiences. It is designed to support countries in satisfying their obligations under 
international agreements as well as in carrying out domestic enforcement, available at 
http://www.imcsnet.org (last visited March 17, 2004). 
133 David J. Agnew & Colin T. Barnes, The Economic and Social Effects of 
IUU / Foe Fishing, Background paper for OECD Workshop on Illegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated (lUU)lFlag of Convenience (FOC) Fishing Activities, 19 - 20 Apr. 2004, 
OECD Doc. AGRlFIIRD (2003)7,11 (on file with author). 
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